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subsidies that potentially come from a particular house, are discounted by housing market 
agents so that most of them are transferred to the prices of the houses that generate the 
subsidies. By estimating a hedonic prices model applying a regression discontinuity 
approach, we find that the increment in house value estimated because of subsidies is 
similar in magnitude to the present value of the flow of subsidies. Likely effects are found 
on the rent amount. We conclude that subsidies to the poor population through public 
spending in domiciliary public utility services in Colombia is being achieved, if anything, 
in a very limited way. Most of the financial effort on this subject ends up distorting housing 
relative prices according to socioeconomic strata, with an annual cost of up to 0.7% of GDP 
in supposed gross subsidies to domiciliary public utility services. 
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1. Introduction 
 
There is ample consensus about the convenience of subsidizing the consumption of public 
utility services, due to the positive externalities derived by their supply, and the high public 
costs generated by their absence. Based on these principles, most Latin-American countries 
subsidize their supply, and constantly try to improve their targeting systems and to 
minimize social losses associated with the subsidy schemes. 
 
States in the region that allocate subsidies to domiciliary public utility services, DPS, (for 
its acronym in Spanish), have always found a matter of controversy and discussion in the 
way subsidies should be targeted to population, with subsidies coverage and targeting 
systems often criticized from the beginning.
1 Among the ways used in the region to reach 
households with these DPS subsidies, we find cross subsidy schemes, subsidies to 
supplying utilities, cash transfers, etc. Such variety of alternatives, along with the 
socioeconomic and cultural diversity of the countries of the region, have caused that the 
regional consensus about the relevance of handing out subsidies, does not exist on the way 
they should be targeted. 
 
To the lack of technical consensus, it can be added the difficulty to reform the targeting 
systems derived from the complex political economy of subsidies in the region, even more 
when some governments which have been installed in the area, have sought their 
consolidation through subsidy policies to the poor population. 
 
A great deal of Colombian policy regarding social and equality matters through public 
spending has been channeled by means of guaranteeing access to public utility services to 
the needy population. Actually, the targeting strategy used to provide those subsidies has 
                                                 
1 The Colombian case is a clear example. Among recent studies which have assessed Colombia’s current 
system, and that have formulated proposals to improve it, are Fernández (2006), Meléndez (2004) and 
INECON (2006). The Colombian government has also taken some steps towards a system reform with 
proposals such as the one in DNP (2005).   2




The country has several studies which have quantified the DPS public expenditure 
amounts, and the way these are distributed among households of different income levels. 
However, there are no studies that quantify how much of this expenditure actually goes in 
the form of subsidy into the pockets of the households of the housing units in which 
subsidies become effective, rather than ending up being transferred or distorting other 
factors such as relative housing prices. This document presents a quantification of the 
incidence the DPS subsidies and contributions have on housing prices, based on which, it 
estimates the net subsidy the government transfers, and actually stays, in households 
pockets. 
 
Therefore, starting from the concerns that can be found in previous studies, we test the 
hypothesis that subsidies or contributions play a role in determining housing prices, to 
identify some of the limitations of the current targeting system of subsidies to public utility 
services. In order to quantify the incidence of DPS subsidies on house prices, hedonic price 
equations are estimated, in which we apply a regression discontinuity approach as our 
identification strategy. The empirical work is done with information from Bogotá, however, 
the institutional mainframe that rules the DPS subsidy targeting policy is the same 
countrywide, so we expect our results will be consistent with the situation found in 
Colombia's main cities. 
  
It is found that the estimated increment in house value because of subsidies is similar in 
magnitude to the present value of the flow of subsidies, discounted at reasonable market 
rates. Comparable effects are found when we assess the effect of subsidies on leasing 
prices. 
 
                                                 
2 In particular, the System of Beneficiaries Selection (SISBEN), a proxy-means test used to order households 
from poorest to richest, uses the stratum of the household in order to compute the index. The index is used to 
target more than 2% of GDP annually in health supply and demand subsidies.   3
This takes us to conclude that the function of subsidy financing for the poor population 
through public utility services fiscal spending in Colombia, is not being achieved. Most of 
the fiscal effort on this matter would have as its final effect, the distortion on housing prices 
in different socioeconomic strata. While the public sector distributes approximately 0.7% of 
the GNP in allegedly subsidies to public utility services in Colombia each year, its final 
effect is to introduce an additional characteristic to a set of houses, that would not have it 
without such expenditure, and moving the housing market to auction such characteristic, 
with the consequential distortion on housing relative prices. 
 
The article begins presenting the subject’s background for Colombia, in which the way the 
country has consolidated its targeting strategy, and the targeting principles, are described.  
Then, we summarize the findings of related studies, describe our methodology and data, 




The targeting mechanisms implemented by the Colombian government since the second 
half of the XX century has changed very slowly, from simple ones based exclusively on 
consumption levels, to more complex ones that combine both consumption levels and 
characteristics of housings and their neighborhoods. Until 1968, the country delivered 
subsidies to public utility services by means of a scheme of increasing block pricing, IBP, 
with very low rates for the lower levels of consumption, and higher rates as consumption 
levels increased. This strategy, lacked a strong legal mainframe for its application, a 
reference unitary cost of services provided for the allocation of subsidies, and was 
supported on direct government financing of the required infrastructure developments. 
Even though it was inspired under the principle by which those better off would have 
higher consumption levels, and thus, would be subject to higher rates; rich and poor 
households showing a below average consumption benefited from a subsidy amount and 
ended up paying a rate below the cost of providing the service, a reason why utility 
companies did not have favorable cost recovery levels and were not able to undertake 
infrastructure investment, network maintenance and others, which inevitably caused a   4
detriment in quality of the services supplied and a low coverage expansion. This scheme 
ended up characterized by high levels of inclusion of non poor and exclusion of the poor. In 




In order to improve the targeting of subsidies, by 1968, the Junta Nacional de Tarifas, JNT, 
the Colombian institution in charge of determining public utility services rates and 
monitoring utilities compliance with rates, introduced two new inputs to the targeting 
mechanisms: (i) the definition of a basic consumption level, which would have the higher 
subsidized rates, and (ii) different IBP structures conditional on housing appraisal.
4 By 
1984, the JNT substituted the use of the housing appraisal method with the Department of 
National Statistics socioeconomic strata system, which characterized housing units 
according to their characteristics and those of their neighborhoods. Still, under this new 
scheme the system recovered only up to a 39% of electricity cost of supply.
5 Once this 
change took place, users publicly complained by means of manifestations, providing an 
example of how sensible this issue is in the country. 
 
Seeking to improve the stratification as targeting mechanism, the JNT, along with other 
utilities, developed new stratification methodologies between 1984 and 1989.
6 Nonetheless, 
by then utility companies, which were mostly public, kept having poor cost recovery levels, 
low infrastructure investment, poor quality and limited coverage expansion.
7 
 
With the new legal guidelines from the beginning (1991 Constitution) and middle of the 
nineties (laws 142 and 143 of 1994), a new conception of domiciliary public utilities took 
shape in Colombia, which focused on the implementation of an efficient supply of public 
                                                 
3 See INECON (2006) y Millán (2006). 
4 Ibid. 
5 See Millán (2006). 
6 Ibid. 
7 Even though the first companies born in Colombia aiming to supply public utility services grew between 
1875 and 1930 and were out of private initiative, after that period; they were bought by the State, which by 
1970 had become the main public utility services supplier in the country. See Meléndez (2004).   5
utility services based on the criteria of solidarity, self-financing, redistribution, and of 
course, social and economic efficiency.
8 
 
The government assigned the task of designing the methodology for municipalities to 
stratify to the Department of National Planning, DNP, while municipalities were 
responsible to implement it at least every five years. There would be six socioeconomic 
strata, being strata one to three subsidized, the fourth would pay the marginal cost of the 
services, and strata five and six, along with the commercial and industrial sectors would 
pay contributions. Subsidies would be granted only to consumption levels below the basic.
9 
Since socioeconomic strata were created, they have been used as well to set differentiable 
rates such as taxation and university tuition fees, to grant access to health subsidies, etc. 
 
Latin American experience with subsidies to public utility services: the case of piped water 
 
Subsidies to public utility services are a common characteristic in most Latin American 
countries. As it is shown by ADERASA (2005), in the case of piped water and sewerage, 
more than 10 countries in the region, except Chile, have demand cross subsidies, some have 
direct subsidies, and most have investment subsidies.
10 Most importantly for our purposes: 
most countries have geographically based targeting mechanisms, thus, the inferences we 
will get in this article are likely to apply for several of them.
11 
 
3.  Literature Review 
 
Previous studies aiming to estimate the incidence of residential subsidies to public utility 
services in Colombia have adopted an accounting approach by which they estimate the 
amount of subsidies generated in each housing unit, and then proceed to sort households by 
income in order to estimate how subsidies are assigned across the income distribution.  
                                                 
8 See DNP (2005). 
9 Basic consumption levels were fixed in 200 KWh/month, and 20 M
3/month. 
10 Among the countries with cross subsidies to piped water and sewerage they report Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. 
11 Among the countries geographic targeting mechanisms to assign piped water and sewerage subsidies they 
report Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil (Sao Paulo), Colombia, Panama, and Peru. In addition, Paraguay and some 
cities from Brazil use household characteristics and socioeconomic conditions.   6
 
Table 1 presents the distribution of demand subsidies in Bogotá to piped water and 
electricity for 1970, 1992 and 2003.
12  From the table emerges a clear pattern: increases in 
the subsidies between 1970 and 1992, and reductions between 1992 and 2003, in particular, 
for electricity. Such reduction might have had to do with the changes introduced by the 
1991 Constitution along with laws 142 and 143 of 1994, which promoted a self sustainable 
system of provision of public utility services. On the other hand, even though it can be 
observed that the incidence of subsidies relative to earnings is higher for the poorest, the 
distribution of subsidies across deciles has been historically somewhat progressive, but in a 
very modest magnitude. 
 
Table 1. Subsidy as a percentage of household’s income. Bogotá. 
1970
* 1973
** 1992 2003 1970
* 1992 2003
1 NA 3.0 7.6 0.2 5.7 5.0
2 NA 1.7 3.4 0.4 3.6 2.2
3 NA 1.3 2.5 0.3 2.6 1.7
4 0.9 1.1 1.9 0.3 2.3 1.2
5 0.7 0.8 1.5 0.3 1.7 1.0
6 0.5 0.6 1.1 0.2 1.5 0.7
7 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.2 1.3 0.5
8 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.9 0.3
9 -0.2 0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.7 0.1
10 -0.8 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.3 -0.1








NA: Not Avalilable. 1992: Vélez (1996), 2003: authors’ estimates based on ECV2003. 
* Source: Gutiérrez de Gómez (1975), quoted by Selowsky (1979). 
** Source: Lundquist (1973), quoted by Selowsky (1979). 
 
Other studies have evaluated and proposed targeting alternatives to stratification. Among 
these studies we find Selowsky (1979), Vélez (1996), Sánchez and Núñez (2000), 
Meléndez (2004), Fernández (2004), Lasso (2004), Montenegro and Rivas (2005), and 
INECON (2006), among others.
13 Meléndez proposes to lower the basic or subsistence 
consumption levels for water and electricity (conditioning on altitude in the case of 
                                                 
12 Sánchez and Núñez (2000), Meléndez (2004), Fernández (2004), Lasso (2004), and INECON (2006) do not 
report estimates for Bogotá. 
13 Even the government did it in a recent policy document (see DNP (2005))   7
electricity), and complementing stratification with the use of additional housing 
characteristics and the level of education of the head of household in order to determine 
whether the household is eligible for subsidies, should pay the marginal cost or should pay 
a contribution.
14 Fernández (2004), assessed the accuracy of stratification in targeting the 
poor, and estimated that for all public utility services the inclusion error increased from 
53% to 58% between 1993 and 2003, making evident the limitations of the system.
15 
INECON recognizes as well important deficiencies in the targeting mechanism based 
merely on stratification, mostly due to the wide heterogeneity of households residing in 
stratum three. It mentions the potential use of a Colombian proxy-means test denominated 
Sisben as a better option than stratification; nonetheless, it points out several drawbacks 
previously detected in that instrument that would require it to be improved with respect to 
its current standards. Finally, it estimates the magnitude of gross demand subsidies to be 
0.67% of GDP, with contributions of 0.41% of GDP, to get a net demand subsidy of 0.26% 
of GDP.
16 In addition, the system receives nearly 0.3% of GDP in supply subsidies. 
 
Finally, DNP (2005), analyses the nature and convenience of socioeconomic stratification 
as targeting instrument. The policy document highlights several limitations of the 
stratification as a targeting mechanism, and recommends assessing it and redesigning its 
methodology. In addition, it requests the evaluation of new conditions for households living 
in stratum three to become beneficiaries of subsidies, such as Colombian’s proxy-means 
test, denominated Sisben. 
 
As mentioned earlier, previous work on the topic does not deal with the issue of whether 
the estimated amount of subsidies received by each housing unit is ultimately benefiting the 
                                                 
14 In July 2004, the Colombian government mandated the gradual reduction in electricity basic consumption 
levels from 200 KWh in 2003, to 173 and 130 KWh in municipalities below and above an altitude of 1000 
meters respectively, by 2007 (See INECON (2006)). 
15 Inclusion error in this paper, is understood as the fraction of the population receiving subsidies whose 
income is not among the first two fifths of the income distribution. 
16 It includes gross subsidies to households in strata 1, 2 and 3, to piped water (0.15%), sewerage (0.08%), 
telecommunications (0.09%), and electricity (0.32%). The magnitude of demand subsidies estimated is 
consistent with Lasso (2004), who found a gross subsidy of 0.73% of GDP and contributions from strata 5 
and 6 of 0.2% of GDP. About 0.2% of the contributions come from commerce and industry, the other 0.2% of 
GDP comes from households in strata 5 and 6.   8
household that inhabits it, the landlord if different from the tenant, or none of these but just 




Even if demand subsidies to DPS can affect the value of multiple factors associated to 
them, and also have bearings on the behavior of household members, this paper focuses on 
the incidence these subsidies can have on housing prices, and therefore, on estimating the 
subsidy households receive, net of such effect. 
 
Our approach is based on the hypothesis that the housing market takes into account the 
flow of subsidies or taxes that residents of certain dwellings will receive or pay. To clarify 
this concept, let’s suppose two identical houses are compared, one in stratum 4 and the 
other one in stratum 3, and that in addition, they are located on the same street, one in front 
of the other. In this hypothetical case, the only difference between the houses would be 
their stratum, and the subsidy level that the one located in stratum 3 would have compared 
with the one in stratum 4, which would pay the total cost of the service. If the monthly 
subsidy received by the inhabitants occupying the house located in stratum 3 is Si, then 
these residents would be willing to pay the net present value of the flow of subsidies 
expected to be received, net of their deadweight loss. This is the standard tax capitalization 
approach, developed by Oates (1969). 
 
To find the DPS subsidy incidence on housing prices, a hedonic price function is estimated. 
The estimated function describes the equilibrium that reveals the willingness to pay by 
heterogeneous market agents for each one of the characteristics that comprise the non-
elastic housing supply.
17 The relationship we estimate is the following: 
Where  i p  is the price of house i located at strata j, the Xij vector contains characteristics of 
the house and its neighborhood (at the census sector level), Sij is the monthly DPS subsidy 
                                                 
17 The estimated Coefficients of that function represent the price paid by the marginal purchaser. See Rosen 
(1974) 
) 1 ( ij ij ij ij u S X p + + + = γ β α ´ ) ln(  9
amount that could potentially be obtained by living in the house, and uij is a random 
shock.
18 According to our previous argument, if the capitalization approach works, then we 
would expect a positive effect of subsidies on housing prices in equation (1).  
 
Specifications similar to the one defined in equation (1) have previously been estimated for 
Colombia and other countries.
19 Nonetheless, the precision of the results depends on 
whether one includes all relevant information associated to housing prices. As it can be 
observed in figure 1, there is significant variation in subsidy amounts within each 
socioeconomic stratum, which could be explained by the heterogeneity in DPS demand 
within stratum, as a function of characteristics of dwellings and those of their inhabitants. 
In addition, we will exploit subsidy variations explained by the different DPS IBP faced by 
housings on both sides of strata borderlines. 
 
If the changes in subsidies to DPS consumption are mainly associated with changes in 
household socioeconomic stratum, then it is important to control for the characteristics that 
determine the stratum for each house, the ones that are only partially observable. In 
addition, the characteristics that determine the stratum for a set of houses, can change in 
different zones of the same stratum, and be associated with the houses appraisal in different 
ways. For example, a set of houses could be in stratum six because of their luxurious 
                                                 
18 Variables such as number of bathrooms and bedrooms, quality of piped water and sewer services, the 
presence of services in the home, etc. are included, and from neighborhoods, variables such as the proximity 
to green zones, transportation terminals or airports, etc. There is a group of important variables that have as 
their source the District Real State Appraisal such as the built area and the lot area and some strata dummy 
variables interactions with the built area and lot that are introduced to capture the differentiated effect of the 
dimensions of the units across the different strata. Si is calculated based on the paid amount in every DPS 
reported by the households in the Living Standard Measurement Survey of 2003, the socioeconomic strata 
based on which the energy bill is charged, and with the rate structure for each one of the services in Bogotá 
for June 2003, which are published in the sites of control entities in Colombia: http://www.creg.gov.co/ 
(Comisión Reguladora de Energía y Gas)(Electricity and Piped Gas Regulatory Commission), 
http://www.cra.gov.co/ (Comisión Reguladora de Agua)(Piped Water Regulatory Commission), and 
http://www.superservicios.gov.co/ (Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios)(Superintendence 
of Domiciliary Public Utility Services). The amounts of subsidy received by each household for electricity, 
piped gas and water and sewage are included. Besides the linear subsidies, their squares are as well included 
in the regression to allow detecting possible non-linearities on the effect of subsidies on housing prices. 
19 Among the papers that use this approach for Colombia are the Castellar (1991), which estimates the 
implicit price of different attributes of the peasant’s farm, and the Carrianzo (1999), which performs hedonic 
regressions for Bogotá’s housing market. Lasso (2005) estimates a similar equation in which he aims to 
determine the incidence of DPS subsidies on house rental value in Colombia. International literature on 
hedonic prices and their methodological approaches can be read in Castellar (1991), Cheshire and others 
(1999).   10
characteristics, while others could be in the same stratum because they have a better 
provision of public goods, even if they are not as luxurious. Omitting this information could 
potentially bias the results from equation (1). 
 
To overcome these difficulties, our approach begins by taking advantage of the form in 
which the socioeconomic stratification is determined for housing units in urban areas in 
Colombia. In this process, each city is divided into six socioeconomic strata that somehow 
represent housing areas that share similar characteristics. Despite such stratification, it is 
important to note that the number of strata is small to cluster all houses of each city in 
homogeneous groups, so that differences in characteristics of houses of different strata 
become actually significant. 
 
This aspect becomes clear when the case of Bogotá is analyzed. A city with over 40 
thousand blocks of houses is grouped in six strata for the purpose of subsidy targeting, just 
as any other city in the country. In this case, each stratum contains an average of seven 
thousand blocks, Thus, it is hard to make the case that all housing units are significantly 
different across strata. 
 
Under the mentioned stratification system, we would expect that houses on both sides of 
the borders that divide socioeconomic strata have more subtle differences the closer they 
are to their nearest boundaries. Thus, comparing houses close to the border on both sides 
will control for unobservable characteristics of houses and their neighborhoods. If, in 
addition, it is possible to differentiate neighboring houses in a sector of the city from those 
in another sector (say, stratum 2 in the center of the city versus stratum 2 in the south), it 
will also be possible to control for unobservable differences like the ones associated to the 
supply of public goods in different parts of the city. To account for these factors, the 
following model is estimated: 
where Kb represents a vector of boundary dummies. These variables are such that every 
house close to a borderline between two strata is associated to only one boundary dummy, 
and all houses near that boundary will also be associated to the same boundary. 
( ) 2 ijb ijb b ijb ijb u S K X p + + + + = γ δ β α ´ ´ ) ln(  11
 
Empirically, it is not obvious whether the omitted variable problem, if present in our 
exercise, would underestimate or overestimate the results obtained from equation (1). On 
the one hand, the effect of introducing the boundary dummies, would depend on the 
correlation between them, net of the controls already included in (1), and the subsidies. On 
the other hand, comparing different sets of houses according to their distance to their 
respective boundaries, would correct potential biases as we take houses closer to their 
closest boundaries, coming mostly from comparing incomparable households, but in an 
unpredictable way. 
 
Our methodology is thus based on the following assumptions: (i) subsidies change 
discontinuously at the boundaries, (ii) observable and unobservable characteristics of 
houses change continuously at the boundaries, (iii) the effect of public utility subsidies on 
house prices is continuous at the boundaries, and (iv) the amount of subsidies is 




Annexes 1 to 3 present evidence that differences in means of the characteristics of houses 
on opposite sides of their respective frontiers, becomes statistically not significant for 
several of the control variables, as we consider houses that are closer to their respective 
frontiers. While houses that are on average 750 m. from the frontier, 58% of the control 
variables have means that are statistically different on both sides of the frontiers, only 42% 
of them are different when considering houses 150 m. from their respective frontiers. 
 
To provide further evidence, we split the sample into those households located on the better 
and worse sides of their respective boundaries, and compute local linear regression, LLR, 
estimates of all variables for each of these samples.
21 Annex 2 illustrates the results for 
                                                 
20 Assumptions (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) are know as the standard RD, the continuity of characteristics and 
treatment effect, and conditional independence assumptions. 
21 LLR is a nonparametric regression technique, in which estimates can be obtained by running weighted least 
squares of the variable of interest Yi, for each house i with value of Prob(distance to nearest frontier = Dj), on 
a constant term, and on the difference Prob(distance to nearest frontier = Dj)-Prob(distance to nearest frontier 
= Di), using data on other houses j on the same side of the boundary. The estimated intercept will be the LLR   12
energy and water subsidies, and for some control variables, including whether the kitchen is 
a individual room, the number of bathrooms, whether the dwellings are houses or not, and 
whether the house has potable water service. Although the control variables shown in the 
figure seem to register a discontinuity around the boundaries, annex 3 shows that none of 
them actually does. Annexes 1 to 3 present evidence that strongly supports assumptions (i) 
and (ii) enumerated above. First, they show how differences in LLR estimates of energy 
and water subsidies, evaluated near the boundaries, are statistically significant across 
boundaries. Secondly, they show that as we move closer to the boundaries, to a point right 
next to them, only 12.5% (instead of the 42% obtained 150 m. from the boundary in annex 
1) of the control variables remain being statistically different across boundaries, providing 
additional evidence that as we move closer to the boundaries, differences across boundaries 
in housing units and their neighborhoods diminish.
22 
 
Errors in stratum measurement  
 
The methodology used to identify the effects of DPS subsidies on housing prices requires 
the socioeconomic stratum of the house to be precisely measured, since the measurement of 
the subsidies received by the household, our variable of interest, crucially depends on this. 
 
In the ECV2003, each household is asked what stratum does public utility services 
companies base the billing on for their electricity service. In principle, the stratum 
information should be taken directly from the electricity bill provided by a member of the 
household answering the survey. However, in some circumstances, the stratum written 
down by the interviewer could not match the household’s actual electricity stratum, not to 
mention the piped water and sewerage stratum, which is not asked for in the survey and 
                                                                                                                                                     
estimate E(Yi|Pr(Dj)). We use a biweight kernel, K(s) = 15/16·(s
2-1)
2 for |s|<1, K(s) = 0 otherwise, where s = 
Pr(Dj)- Pr(Di), as weights, and a half bandwidth (the magnitude that defines the distance from i which we are 
using to select the other houses j to get our estimate) of 300 m. (using other bandwidths we obtained similar 
results). LLR estimates are better than the more traditional kernel regression estimator because its bias does 
not depend on the density of the data, and the order of convergence of its bias is the same at boundary points 
as at interior points (see Fan 1992, 1993, and Heckman et.al. 1998). 
22 The difference in house valuation across boundaries is not statistically significant because it does not 
control for characteristics that differ across boundaries. Nonetheless, it becomes clear from annexes 1 and 3 
that once we compare houses closer to the boundaries, the difference not only shortens, but also changes its 
sign in the expected way.   13
might be different than the one for electricity, even for the same house. In some cases, the 
electricity bill is not available at the time of the survey. In this case, the surveyed individual 
could report not knowing what the stratum is, and the interviewer will record it as 
unknown.  The individual could also report an incorrect stratum. 
 
Also, as foreseen by Dane (2003), in case that the electricity bills does not specify the 
stratum in some cities, but report the residential qualitative category ranging from “Low-
Low” to “High”, the interviewer translates those categories into strata.
23 It can also be the 
case that there is a small business or factory in the house and due to this, the electricity bill 
is paid at commercial or industrial rates. In this case, the interviewer has to assign the most 
frequent stratum reported in houses of the same housing segment the house is located in.  
 
On the other hand, it can be the case that in condominiums or buildings, where the survey is 
answered by several households, one of the interviewed homes does not provide 
information about the electricity stratum and/or how many times per week the garbage 
truck comes by to pick up the trash. In this case, the interviewer deduces the stratum from 
other forms filled in that same condominium or building.
24 
 
As it was mentioned before, the stratum of housing units in our sample is based on 
ECV2003 data and also, on the information collected from the Administrative Department 
of District Real State Appraisal of Bogotá, DACD (for its acronym in Spanish). However, 
the stratum obtained from the DACD information could have a measurement error as well, 
since this data is available only for year 2000, three years before the ECV2003 was 
collected, and therefore, some households could have had their stratum changed before the 
survey. 
 
                                                 
23 The assimilation is done based on the following convention:  Low–Low→stratum 1, Low→stratum 2, 
Middle–Low→stratum 3, Middle→stratum 4, Middle–High→stratum 5, and High→stratum 6. 
24 In addition, it is recommended to the surveyors to take into account that in one same block the stratum can 
change from one house to the other. However, the DAPD claims that the city stratification is defined for all 
the houses on the same block, and that only in exceptional cases, a house in a certain block is classified in a 
stratum different to the one of the other houses on its block.   14
Table 2 shows the inconsistencies that exist between the two housing stratum 
measurements. About 10% of the households in the ECV2003 give a stratum that does not 
match the official DACD stratification.  
 
Table 2. Number of houses per stratum, ECV2003 and DACD. Bogotá, 2003. 
     Stratum given by the surveyed in ECV2003 
  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  Total 
0 0  17 125 133  59  10 16  360 
1  1  555 90 18  0 0 0 664 
2  0 123 3,699 109 9 0 0  3,940 
3  1 78  223  5,199 41 1 1  5,544 
4  0 31  1  77  1,359  32 0 1,500 
5  0 0  0  0  7  313  20 340 
6  0 7  0  1  2  22  365  397 
DACD 
Stratum 
Total  2 811 4,138 5,537 1,477  378  402  12,745
 Match  11,490               
  Do not Match   1,255               
Source: ECV2003, DACD. 
 
Map 1 shows a graphic illustration of the location of some of the houses stratified in 
ECV2003 different to DACD. These cases are more frequent in the vicinity of borders 
among strata, and measurement errors are also frequent inside strata. 
 
Map 1. Measurement errors in the definition of socioeconomic stratum. Bogotá, 2003   15
Source: ECV2003, DACD. 
 
With the aim of correcting the bias from measurement error, the DACD stratum is used for 
the instrumentation of the ECV2003 stratum. The exercise assumes that the ECV2003 
stratum, E
ECV2003, and DACD’s, E
DACD, are defined based on: 
where Ei is the actual stratum for house i, and εi y ηi represent measurement errors.
25 
 
Therefore, when we talk about strata in our results section, we will mention two strata: the 
one from ECV2003, and its prediction using instrumental variables, with the DACD 
stratum as instrument. The predicted stratum is obtained by the estimation of an ordered 
probit model based on: 
With the stratum predicted through this regression, new subsidies are estimated and new 




We use data that combines information for Bogotá city from three sources: (i) Living 
Standards Measurement Survey, (LSMS) by Dane, collected in 2003 (ECV2003), which 
provides information about households, their dwellings and neigborhoods; (ii) the 
Administrative Department of District Real State Appraisal of Bogotá, DACD, from where 
we obtain the socioeconomic stratification and the real state appraisal of Bogotá’s houses, 
and (iii) the 1993 population census, from which we estimate the surrounding variables for 
Bogotá at census sector level.
26 
 
The left side in Map 2 illustrates the stratification in Bogotá, and the right side includes an 
enlargement of a city zone that shows the way how boundary dummies were constructed. In 
the enlargement, all the houses inside circle 6 and that are on both sides of the boundary 
                                                 
25 Since the sources from which we get houses’ stratum, namely the ECV2003 and DACD, are completely 
independent, the key assumption that ηi y εi are independent and independent from Ei and from uijb, is 
expected to hold in this case. 
26 Bogotá is divided into more than 600 census sectors. 
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between strata two (houses to the south on the strata dividing line) and three (houses to the 
north of said line) have K6=1 while the other houses in the city have K6=0. 
 
These fixed effects to which the houses are associated, would allow us to control for the 
presence of mass transportation systems (not observable in the survey) available in the 
surroundings of boundary 6, and not available in boundary 11, also included in the enlarged 
map. The comparison of houses within boundary, allows us to control for the unobservable 
variables of the neighborhood that determine the stratum classification and that are not 
available as control variables. When estimating (2) only with households at a certain 
distance from the boundary to which they belong, we chose the household to be included in 
the regression, with a distance variable defined as the distance from each house to the 
nearest house located at the other's side of the stratum boundary. 
 
Map 2. Stratification and boundary dummies. Bogotá, 2003 
 
This way, and under the assumption that border location is relatively arbitrary given the 
large number of blocks stratification puts into only six groups, the specification used in (2)   17
is consistent with the assumptions on which regression discontinuity design, RDD, is based, 
in which houses around a cut-off point (in this case, the borders between two 
socioeconomic strata) are usually compared and that the only difference is that houses 
located on one side are subject to an intervention (in this case, subsidized DPS rates), and 
the ones on the other side are not.
27 
 
Estimation of DPS subsidy 
Equation (2) assumes inhabitants in each house receive a monthly subsidy, Si, which can be 
predicted by market agents on the basis of household characteristics, and particularly, on 
the socioeconomic stratum it is located in. Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of electricity 
subsidies by socioeconomic strata, which gives an idea of the probability of having a 
specific amount of monthly subsidy given the stratum where the house is located. 
 
As it can be seen in the figure, a house located in stratum 1, 2 or 3 will almost surely 
receive a subsidy of up to $20,000 per month, while one in stratum 4 would pay the exact 
cost of its DPSs, thus not receiving any subsidy nor paying taxes, and in stratum 5 or 6 it 
would certainly pay a tax, not bounded in theory, but in practice observed to have a 
monthly average of $12.000. In addition to the stratum, agents in the market observe other 
attributes of the house and its neighborhood associated to the potential subsidy, such as its 
area, number of bedrooms, etc., based on which the potential DPS subsidy amount for the 
particular house is estimated. 
 
Figure 1. Electricity subsidy distribution 
per socioeconomic stratum in Bogotá, 2003 
                                                 
27 Black (1999) uses a similar approach to estimate the willingness to pay for education quality. Other RDD 
applications include Van der Klaauw (2002), Hahn et al. (1999), and Hahn et al. (2001). Even though there 
are no similar RDD applications for Colombia, there are works that take into account the spatial dimension in 
special house hedonic price models. Goyeneche  (2003) involves the spatial dimension to examine the impact 
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While piped water and sewerage services have three rate blocks that also define the so 
called subsistence, complementary and sumptuary consumptions, consumptions such as 
electricity and piped gas have only two blocks.
28 Figure 2 describes the bill that for each 
service, households in different strata have to pay according to their consumption level, and 
also, the respective cost of supplying the service. The marginal price of the service is the 
slope in each curve. For electricity, strata 1, 2 and 3 pay a subsidized rate for consumption 
up to the subsistence level, and a rate equal to the cost for higher consumptions, stratum 4 
pays a rate equal to the cost, and strata 5 and 6 pay a rate above the cost
29. 
 
                                                 
28 For electricity, the subsistence consumption is 200 Kw, while that for piped water and sewerage is 20 cubic 
meters. Any consumption below those quantities has a marginal price lower than its cost for households 
located in the poorest strata. 
29 The value of the bill is calculated according to: 
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where V , corresponds to the bill value for a house located in strata e, 
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0
e v  is the fixed charge collected from 
houses located in strata e, 
) (e
i p is the marginal price in the price block i , for a household located in stratum e, 
i q  indicates the quantity consumed by the house in price block i, n indicates the number of intervals, and k 
the interval where Q is located.   19
Figure 2. Rates schedule for public utility services by stratum, Bogotá, 2003 
 
Tables 3 and 4 show that for both services, most of the households are in the subsistence 
consumption interval. For electricity, 62% of households consume in that interval, 78% for 
households (the highest share) in stratum 1, and 21% (the lowest) in stratum 6. For piped 
water, 76% of households consume in the subsistence interval, with shares beyond 70% for 
households in strata one to five, and below 60% for those in stratum 6. According to these 
figures both subsistence consumption levels seem high, nonetheless, the one for piped 
water is much more generous than that for electricity. 
 
Table 3. Households by electricity consumption ranges, Bogotá, 2003 
12 3 4 5 6
<=200 75 108 381 010 456 701 87 809 26 981 12 000 1 039 609
>200 21 488 154 036 264 366 95 375 50 327 44 964 630 555
Total 96 597 535 047 721 070 183 188 77 312 56 970 1 670 184
<=200 7.22 36.65 43.93 8.45 2.60 1.15 100
>200 3.41 24.43 41.93 15.13 7.98 7.13 100
Total 5.78 32.04 43.17 10.97 4.63 3.41 100
<=200 77.75 71.21 63.34 47.93 34.90 21.06 62.25
>200 22.24 28.79 36.66 52.06 65.10 78.93 37.75
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100.00
Q(Kw) Total Stratum
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Source: ECV2003 
 
Table 4. Households by piped water consumption ranges, Bogotá, 2003 
12 3 4 5 6
<=20 52 955 352 725 515 297 123 501 51 145 27 440 1 123 061
(20-40] 17 636 99 118 126 268 43 393 18 657 11 749 316 822
>40 559 5 974 18 126 6 221 2 978 7 034 40 893
Total 71 150 457 817 659 691 173 115 72 780 46 223 1 480 776
<=20 4.72 31.41 45.88 11.00 4.55 2.44 100
(20-40] 5.57 31.29 39.85 13.70 5.89 3.71 100
>40 1.37 14.61 44.33 15.21 7.28 17.20 100
Total 4.80 30.92 44.55 11.69 4.91 3.12 100
<=20 74.43 77.04 78.11 71.34 70.27 59.36 75.84
(20-40] 24.79 21.65 19.14 25.07 25.63 25.42 21.40
>40 0.79 1.30 2.75 3.59 4.09 15.22 2.76





6. Descriptive statistics and results 
 
Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used for our estimation. ECV2003 
is rich in information about a large number of households, with approximately 12,771 
interviewed in Bogotá in 2003. Unfortunately, the information available in ECV2003 to 
estimate all subsidies (electricity, gas, and piped water and sewerage), allows us estimate 
them for only 8,277 households. On the other hand, DACD information allows obtaining 
the real state appraisal values for 8,879 households, which once merged with the 
households with ECV2003 information, gives a total of 5,759 households with complete 
information. 
 
It can be inferred from table 5 that the sample with complete information is not a random 
sample of the households in Bogotá. In particular, it includes a lower proportion of 
households in strata 1 and 2, and higher in strata 3, 4 and 5. It also has houses with higher 
real state appraisals by square meter, lower lot and built areas, and a larger proportion of 
houses. It has houses with more bedrooms and bathrooms, and a higher probability of 
having piped gas, telephone service, garage, and terrace, and in general, better house 
characteristics. 
   21
Table 6 shows housing prices and utility subsidies amounts by stratum.
30 These data reveal 
the need to control in our empirical exercise for characteristics on which the socioeconomic 
strata are determined, with the aim of minimizing the possibility of obtaining biased 
coefficients. 
 
To estimate equation (2) we constructed 56 boundary dummies, each of which contains 
between 1.3% and 7.2% of the households with complete information. In constructing these 
variables, houses are associated only to boundaries that have no natural barriers between 
strata, and (since we seek smooth changes in characteristics across boundaries) that do not 
have a large stretch of land that separates the strata from their respective boundary (parks, 
industries, etc.). Next, we show the results obtained when equations (1) and (2) are 
estimated with the logarithm of housing prices. 
 
Table 5. Summary Statistics 
                                                 
30 The price per square meter is defined as the house price divided by the average of square meters of terrain 
and the built square meters.   22
 
Difference
Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. /1
Logarithm of house valuation per square meter 
* 12.13 0.6 3,585 11.91 0.6 *
Logarithm of house valuation 17.49 0.7 3,587 17.46 0.8
House valuation 51,200,000 41,600,000 3,587 55,300,000 72,200,000 *
House valuation per square meter 225,470 158,686 3,585 185,195 153,181 *
Estimated monthly subsidy of energy 5,539 7,591 6,309 5,714 8,223
Estimated monthly subsidy of piped water and sewerage 14,368 16,502 3,182 12,480 18,033 *
Estimated monthly subsidy of piped gas 602 1,521 7,478 479 1,661 *
Number of rooms 3.780 1.404 7,479 3.083 1.538 *
Number of bathrooms 1.681 0.864 7,468 1.471 0.814 *
House with Piped gas service 0.726 0.446 7,479 0.607 0.488 *
House with telephone 0.948 0.223 7,479 0.826 0.379 *
House with garden 0.459 0.498 7,479 0.390 0.488 *
House with court yard 0.039 0.194 7,479 0.051 0.220 *
House with garage  0.340 0.474 7,479 0.245 0.430 *
House with terrace 0.234 0.423 7,479 0.205 0.404 *
Parks in neighborhood 0.121 0.326 7,479 0.138 0.345 *
The house has suffered because of a natural disaster 0.043 0.203 7,479 0.048 0.213
House in area vulnerable to natural disasters 0.070 0.254 7,479 0.070 0.256
Factories in neighborhood 0.121 0.326 7,479 0.117 0.322
Garbage collector in neighborhood 0.031 0.173 7,479 0.030 0.170
Market places in neighborhood 0.065 0.247 7,479 0.073 0.261
Airport in neighborhood 0.043 0.204 7,479 0.032 0.177 *
Terminals of ground transportation in neighborhood 0.031 0.173 7,479 0.034 0.181
House close to open sewers 0.100 0.300 7,479 0.105 0.306
Plants of residual water treatment in neighborhood 0.000 0.014 7,479 0.000 0.016
Lines of hydrocarbon transportation in neighborhood 0.002 0.043 7,479 0.001 0.026
House close to high tension lines of electricity transmission 0.018 0.131 7,479 0.018 0.133
You feel safe in your neighborhood 0.668 0.471 7,479 0.689 0.463 *
Toilet inside the house 0.990 0.098 7,479 0.963 0.190 *
Daily supply of water 0.975 0.155 7,479 0.962 0.192 *
Provision of water is inside the house 0.989 0.103 7,479 0.961 0.194 *
The kitchen is a individual room 0.980 0.140 7,479 0.947 0.225 *
House
** 0.456 0.498 7,479 0.322 0.467 *
Walls material is any of: Brick, block, stone, polished wood  0.986 0.116 7,479 0.973 0.163 *
Floor material is any of: Marmol, parque, lacquered wood 0.089 0.284 7,479 0.080 0.272
Floor material is Carpet 0.139 0.346 7,479 0.128 0.335
Floor material is any of: Floor tile, vinyl, tablet, wood  0.618 0.486 7,479 0.578 0.494 *
Floor material is any of: Coarse wood, table, plank 0.044 0.205 7,479 0.062 0.241 *
Floor material is any of: Cement, gravilla, earth, sand 0.110 0.313 7,479 0.152 0.359 *
House with Toilet connected to the public sewerage 0.995 0.073 7,479 0.985 0.120 *
House with potable water service 0.995 0.071 7,479 0.979 0.144 *
Number of infantile shelters by censal sector 0.066 0.296 7,479 0.072 0.387
Number of asylums  by censal sector 0.143 0.473 7,479 0.137 0.443
Number of prisons by censal sector 0.011 0.117 7,479 0.017 0.141 *
Number of convents  by censal sector 0.259 0.878 7,479 0.260 0.895
Stratum 1 0.043 0.202 7,479 0.082 0.274 *
Stratum 2 0.289 0.453 7,479 0.349 0.477 *
Stratum 3 0.465 0.499 7,479 0.411 0.492 *
Stratum 4 0.139 0.346 7,479 0.099 0.299 *
Stratum 5 0.038 0.192 7,479 0.024 0.152 *
Stratum 6 0.025 0.157 7,479 0.036 0.186 *
Area of the land (squared meters) 104.7 89.1 3,587 138.0 459.5 *
Interaction variable Land*stratum2 27.3 70.1 3,587 46.0 96.8 *
Interaction variable Land*stratum3 52.6 77.4 3,587 57.4 100.9 *
Interaction variable Land*stratum4 13.7 47.3 3,587 9.1 44.4 *
Interaction variable Land*stratum5 2.5 20.1 3,587 4.2 110.9
Interaction variable Land*stratum6 1.7 17.1 3,587 3.8 37.8 *
Constructed area (squared meters) 157.5 106.7 3,587 196.5 184.1 *
Interaction variable Constructed area*stratum2 40.3 84.3 3,587 68.9 115.1 *
Interaction variable Constructed area*stratum3 82.9 119.1 3,587 95.1 184.2 *
Interaction variable Constructed area*stratum4 18.7 57.1 3,587 12.3 56.9 *
Interaction variable Constructed area*stratum5 4.2 28.5 3,587 3.4 30.8
Interaction variable Constructed area*stratum6 3.5 25.0 3,587 5.1 36.7 *
Number of Observations
1/ Variables with difference statisticaly significant have "*".
* The square meters used is the sum of those of land plus those of construction.
** Dummy==1 if
living in house (as opposed to an apartment, etc.)
Variable
Complete information Incomplete information
5,292  23
Table 6. House price per square meter and subsidies, 
per socioeconomic stratum. Bogotá, 2003 
Number of Housing  Housing
Obseravtions Price/M
2 * Price 
* Energy Water and Sewerage Piped Gas
1 222 85,194 20,500,000 14,658 33,031 2,441
2 1,531 129,128 28,000,000 12,044 26,700 2,176
3 2,462 199,558 48,400,000 4,859 13,083 0
4 738 396,539 76,800,000 0 8,372 0
5 202 510,514 113,000,000 -12,968 -22,385 -1,911
6 133 723,551 151,000,000 -15,046 -47,480 -1,675
Total 5,288 225,470 51,200,000 5,539 14,368 602
Subsidies
**
* Source: Administrative Department of Real State Appraisal of Bogotá.






Results of estimating by OLS equations (1) and (2) for the logarithm of house prices are 
shown in table 7. The top panel shows estimates of equation (1) in the first column, and in 
the other columns we show estimates of equation (2) which include boundary dummies, 
and houses closer to the borders.
32 The top panel presents the results for each of the 
subsidies included and their respective square terms, and the following shows the estimates 
when we use the total amount of subsidies and its square, rather than each of its parts. Table 
8 shows the same set of results, once the stratum is instrumented to correct for the presence 
of measurement error. 
 
Estimates yield positive and statistically significant OLS coefficients of electricity 
subsidies, EE, and piped water and sewerage subsidies, AA, on the logarithm of housing 
prices: in most cases for their linear part, and for their quadratic term of EE and total 
subsidy. The linear and quadratic term coefficients of EE subsidy obtained by OLS with no 
boundary dummies and all sample (A in table 7), is slightly overestimated by about 1% and 
7% respectively, with respect to its value when we control for boundary dummies (B in the 
                                                 
31 The real state appraisal value is used as the house price, which is the price of the house estimated by the 
government and is the base for local property taxes. In ECV2003, property owners were asked about the value 
of their house; however, the estimated price gathered from that source is basically subjective and it is 
available only to the owners of the house they reside in. 
32 The reported distances (4,500 m., 1,500 m., 1,000 m., 800 m., 700 m., 600 m., 500 m., and 400 m.) are the 
minimum distance between each house and the closest house of the stratum found on the other side of its 
boundary. On average, the distances from each house to the boundary would approximately be half the 
distances reported in the table (this is, 2,250 m., 750 m., 500 m., 400 m., 350 m., 300 m., 250 m., and 200 m.)   24
table). On the other hand, as we compare houses closer and closer, for the households 
located 250 m. (C in the table, our RD estimates obtained not correcting for measurement 
error) from the boundaries, the linear and quadratic estimates increase up to 48% and 8% 
respectively, with respect to the estimates found when using the whole sample controlling 
for boundary dummies. The linear OLS coefficient of AA subsidies with no boundary 
dummy (A in the table), is as well overestimated, since it falls by 14% when we include the 
boundary dummies (B in the table), but increases again 3% when we analyze only 
households 250 m. from their boundaries (C in the table).
33 The OLS coefficients for the 
total amount of subsidies not controlling for boundary dummies (A in the table) are 9% 
larger than their counterpart with boundary dummies for households 250 m. from their 
boundaries (C in the table). 
 
Table 7. House price model results, OLS 
N = 5292 R²=0.8715 N= 5292 R²=0.8823 N= 4428 R²=0.8997 N= 3935 R²=0.8986 N= 3379 R²=0.9011
Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err.
Energy 3.55E-06 1.28E-06 3.51E-06 1.22E-06 1.85E-06 1.22E-06 2.57E-06 1.33E-06 3.75E-06 1.40E-06
Water and Sewerage 2.41E-06 5.32E-07 2.07E-06 5.59E-07 2.66E-06 6.25E-07 2.59E-06 6.38E-07 2.44E-06 6.68E-07
Piped Gas -2.91E-06 4.75E-06 -2.17E-07 4.61E-06 6.03E-06 4.62E-06 7.56E-06 5.03E-06 6.67E-06 5.31E-06
Energy
2 1.10E-10 3.91E-11 1.02E-10 3.64E-11 9.09E-11 3.72E-11 1.04E-10 3.89E-11 9.26E-11 3.83E-11
Water and Sewerage
2 4.58E-13 7.22E-12 -3.63E-14 8.48E-12 -1.63E-11 1.22E-11 -1.70E-11 1.23E-11 -1.77E-11 1.26E-11
Piped Gas
2 6.32E-10 7.05E-10 2.19E-10 6.89E-10 1.82E-09 6.81E-10 2.08E-09 7.15E-10 1.95E-09 7.41E-10
N=    3140 R²=0.9038 N=    2679 R²=0.8986 N=    2400 R²=0.9007 N=    2085 R²=0.9049 N=    1647 R²=0.9026
Energy 4.43E-06 1.44E-06 4.85E-06 1.62E-06 4.63E-06 1.69E-06 5.21E-06 1.83E-06 5.54E-06 2.13E-06
Water and Sewerage 2.19E-06 6.75E-07 1.98E-06 7.74E-07 1.61E-06 8.01E-07 2.13E-06 9.10E-07 2.86E-06 1.05E-06
Piped Gas 3.22E-06 5.41E-06 -3.63E-07 5.98E-06 -3.36E-06 6.34E-06 -1.34E-06 6.70E-06 -4.56E-06 7.38E-06
Energy
2 1.09E-10 3.88E-11 1.08E-10 4.25E-11 1.06E-10 4.56E-11 1.10E-10 5.05E-11 1.27E-10 6.92E-11
Water and Sewerage
2 -1.60E-11 1.27E-11 -1.44E-11 1.50E-11 -8.06E-12 1.58E-11 -8.76E-12 2.02E-11 -2.90E-11 2.64E-11
Piped Gas
2 1.41E-09 7.48E-10 1.46E-09 8.09E-10 2.06E-09 1.04E-09 2.49E-09 1.09E-09 2.08E-09 1.23E-09
With Boundaries, Equation (2)
All Sample (A) All Sample (B) 1000 m
With Boundaries, Equation (2)
Disaggregated subsidies
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of house price, OLS
900 m 700 m 600 m 500 m (C) 400 m
Without Boundaries, 
Equation (1)




N= 5292 R²=0.8713 N= 5292 R²=0.8821 N= 4341 R²=0.9012 N= 3935 R²=0.8983 N= 3379 R²=0.9008
Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err.
Total Subsidy 2.18E-06 4.29E-07 2.05E-06 4.13E-07 1.68E-06 4.51E-07 1.78E-06 4.75E-07 2.06E-06 4.81E-07
Total Subsidy
2 1.17E-11 4.26E-12 9.56E-12 4.08E-12 1.04E-11 4.91E-12 1.11E-11 5.01E-12 7.97E-12 4.67E-12
N= 3140 R²=0.9035 N= 2679 R²=0.8982 N= 2400 R²=0.9003 N= 2085 R²=0.9044 N= 1647 R²=0.902
Total Subsidy 1.97E-06 4.89E-07 1.82E-06 5.12E-07 1.53E-06 5.61E-07 1.99E-06 6.13E-07 2.20E-06 6.77E-07
Total Subsidy
2 9.04E-12 4.75E-12 1.01E-11 4.74E-12 1.22E-11 5.42E-12 1.40E-11 6.00E-12 9.30E-12 6.58E-12
400 m 900 m 700 m 600 m 500 m (C)
With Boundaries, Equation (2)
All Sample (A) All Sample (B) 4500 m 1500 m 1000 m
Aggregated subsidies






                                                 
33 Nonetheless, neither of the estimates found with equation (2) results statistically different to those found 
with equation (1).   25
Robust standard errors are estimated. Results are very similar when we also adjust them for clustering either 
at the boundary dummy level, or at each side of the boundary dummy level. 
 
Once the model is corrected for measurement error, and the results are compared to the 
ones obtained when estimating the model by OLS, it is found that for houses located 
approximately 250 m. from the border (C tables 7 and 8), the linear coefficient of the EE 
subsidy decreases by 8% and the one for AA increases by 14%, while the quadratic 
coefficient of EE subsidy decreases 60%, and that of the AA subsidy increases by 8%.
34 
Finally, when we compare the estimate that corrects for measurement error and has the 
boundary dummies with the sample of up to 250 m. from the border (C in the table 8, our 
RD estimate obtained after correcting for measurement error), with the estimate obtained 
omitting the boundary dummies and with the whole sample (A in table 8), we find that the 
linear coefficient of EE increases 200% while that of AA decreases 20%. Nonetheless, only 
for distances 400 m. from the boundaries (800 m. in the table) is the linear EE coefficient 
statistically different from zero, while it always the case for the AA subsidy.
35 
 
Table 8. House price model results, IV 
N= 5155 R²=0.8741 N= 5155 R²=0.8837 N= 4343 R²=0.9009 N= 3850 R²=0.8992 N= 3294 R²=0.9013
Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err.
Energy 1.59E-06 1.23E-06 1.63E-06 1.21E-06 2.52E-07 1.20E-06 1.12E-06 1.33E-06 2.63E-06 1.42E-06
Water and Sewerage 3.01E-06 6.04E-07 2.67E-06 5.99E-07 3.09E-06 6.52E-07 3.06E-06 6.49E-07 2.66E-06 6.68E-07
Piped Gas 3.29E-06 4.68E-06 3.70E-06 4.64E-06 7.14E-06 4.70E-06 7.78E-06 5.14E-06 5.51E-06 5.49E-06
Energy
2 7.76E-11 3.87E-11 8.79E-11 3.63E-11 7.62E-11 3.66E-11 9.05E-11 3.84E-11 8.93E-11 3.95E-11
Water and Sewerage
2 -1.76E-11 1.20E-11 -1.89E-11 1.18E-11 -2.68E-11 1.28E-11 -2.82E-11 1.27E-11 -2.31E-11 1.27E-11
Piped Gas
2 1.80E-09 7.34E-10 1.51E-09 7.15E-10 2.37E-09 6.96E-10 2.47E-09 7.41E-10 2.16E-09 7.81E-10
N= 2840 R²=0.9017 N= 2597 R²=0.9012 N= 2318 R²=0.902 N= 2002 R²=0.9057 N= 1569 R²=0.9044
Energy 3.51E-06 1.57E-06 3.61E-06 1.65E-06 4.21E-06 1.78E-06 4.78E-06 1.97E-06 4.57E-06 2.25E-06
Water and Sewerage 2.65E-06 7.29E-07 2.20E-06 7.18E-07 2.09E-06 8.00E-07 2.42E-06 9.35E-07 3.13E-06 1.01E-06
Piped Gas -9.92E-07 5.96E-06 -9.71E-07 6.14E-06 -5.07E-06 6.67E-06 -6.44E-06 7.16E-06 -9.90E-06 7.90E-06
Energy
2 9.89E-11 4.35E-11 6.22E-11 4.44E-11 5.08E-11 4.99E-11 4.42E-11 5.81E-11 4.21E-11 7.61E-11
Water and Sewerage
2 -3.78E-11 1.44E-11 -2.95E-11 1.39E-11 -1.86E-11 1.65E-11 -9.47E-12 2.17E-11 -1.99E-11 2.67E-11
Piped Gas
2 1.50E-09 8.12E-10 1.18E-09 8.28E-10 1.74E-09 1.01E-09 2.06E-09 1.06E-09 1.43E-09 1.18E-09
With Boundaries, Equation (2)
900 m 700 m 600 m 500 m (C) 400 m
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of house price, IV
Disaggregated subsidies
With Boundaries, Equation (2)






                                                 
34 In this case, these pairs of differences are not either statistically different from zero. 
35 Again, once correcting for measurement error, neither of the estimates found with equation (2) with the 
whole sample or 500 m. from the boundary, results statistically different to those found with equation (1). 
Significance of the coefficients is robust to regressions ran correcting for clustering when households in each 
boundary and stratum (that is, each side of the boundary) define a group, or when each boundary (regardless 
of the side of the boundary) defines a group. For example, in the first case, the t-statistic of our RD estimate 
(C in table 8) on the subsidy of energy is 2.3, while that of our RD estimate on the subsidy of water is 1.9. In 
the second case, these figures are 2.3 and 2.2 for our RD coefficients of EE and AA respectively.   26
N= 5153 R²=0.874 N= 5153 R²=0.8836 N= 3848 R²=0.8992 N= 3848 R²=0.8992 N= 3292 R²=0.9011
Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err. Coefficient Std. Err.
Total Subsidy 2.13E-06 4.42E-07 1.88E-06 4.27E-07 1.61E-06 4.55E-07 1.79E-06 4.77E-07 2.00E-06 4.89E-07
Total Subsidy
2 5.85E-12 4.75E-12 5.77E-12 4.52E-12 6.61E-12 4.77E-12 6.38E-12 4.87E-12 5.91E-12 4.70E-12
N= 2838 R²=0.9014 N= 2595 R²=0.9008 N= 2317 R²=0.9022 N= 2002 R²=0.9054 N= 1569 R²=0.904
Total Subsidy 1.95E-06 5.36E-07 1.86E-06 5.47E-07 1.98E-06 6.42E-07 2.40E-06 7.29E-07 2.77E-06 7.30E-07
Total Subsidy
2 -1.74E-13 5.27E-12 -1.32E-12 5.33E-12 1.52E-12 6.72E-12 4.26E-12 7.93E-12 -2.17E-13 7.43E-12
With Boundaries, Equation (2)
All Sample (A) All Sample (B) 4500 m 1500 m 1000 m
With Boundaries, Equation (2)






Robust standard errors are estimated. Results are very similar when we also adjust them for clustering either 
at the boundary dummy level, or at each side of the boundary dummy level. 
 
In sum, the final estimate of the linear EE coefficient (C in table 8) is 35% larger that the 
estimate obtained by OLS with the whole sample (A in table 7), since the OLS estimate is 
underestimated for not restricting the sample to the one closest to the boundaries, and 
overestimated for measurement error. On the other hand, the final estimate of the linear AA 
coefficient (C in table 8) is similar to the estimate obtained by OLS with the whole sample 
(A in table 7), nonetheless, the OLS estimate is overestimated for not including the 
boundary dummies, underestimated for not restricting the sample to the one closest to the 
boundaries, and underestimated for measurement error.
36 In short, the inclusion of 
boundary fixed effects, the comparison of closer houses, and the correction for 
measurement error, are all playing a role in getting us closer to obtaining unbiased 
estimators of the effect of DPS subsidies on housing prices.
37 
 
Table 9 shows the necessary information for the calculation of the elasticity of house prices 
per square meter with respect to each one of the subsidies, using the coefficients obtained in 
columns A, B and C of tables 7 and 8. Differences in the estimated elasticities include 
differences in both the linear and quadratic coefficients of tables 7 and 8. Here again, 
although our RD estimates do not differ significantly from the basic estimates obtained by 
OLS, including in the estimation non comparable households, omitting variables, and not 
                                                 
36 The other estimates found when equation (1) is estimated (column A in table 7) are included in Annex 4. As 
it is shown, the value of houses increases with better characteristics such as their number of rooms, of 
bathrooms, if the house has piped gas, garden, garage, kitchen in an individual room, better floor materials, 
toilet connected to public sewerage, if there are parks in their neighborhood, and there are public services like 
ground transportation, no open sewers, no garbage collectors, or potable water, if the house is located in a 
better stratum, and if the are of land, or constructed, is larger. 
37 Nonetheless, the coefficients obtained with equation (2) with the whole sample or 500 m. from the 
boundary, and those obtained with equation (1) are not statistically different.   27
correcting for measurement error, are all effects that bias the estimates in counterbalancing 
ways that become uncovered with the comparison of the total change in the estimates. As 
shown in the table, our RD estimates are very similar for EE (2.97%) and AA (2.95%). 
 
Table 9. Implicit elasticities between subsidy and house prices
/1 
500 m. 500 m.
Without BD With BD With BD Without BD With BD With BD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.0270 0.0263 0.0363 0.0139 0.0148 0.0297 10% 0.18
0.0081 0.0079 0.0120 0.0077 0.0075 0.0126
0.0331 0.0283 0.0258 0.0345 0.0294 0.0295 -11% -0.26
0.0083 0.0079 0.0111 0.0077 0.0077 0.0108
0.0520 0.0411 0.0505 0.0465 0.0415 0.0505 -3% -0.09



































1/ Results are obtained with the sample located at an average 250 m. from the border (500 m. between each 
house and the closest one from another stratum), and correcting for measurement error. Robust standard 
errors. 
* Each line includes all households who reported the amount paid last month for its consumption, and 
received subsidies, of that respective service (EE, AA or both). 
** Each line includes all households who 
reported the amount paid last month for its consumption, and paid contributions, of that respective service 
(EE, AA or both). 
*** Each line includes all households who reported the amount paid last month for its 
consumption, regardless of whether they received subsidies or paid contributions in any service (EE and AA). 
 
With the aim of estimating the subsidy received by households, net of its effect on housing 
prices, in table 10 we present estimates of the current net present value, NPV, for all 
subsidies and contributions, discounted at 10% annual real interest rates in the top panel, 
and at 15% annual real interest rates in the lower, and the changes that a 100% variation in 
subsidies implies on house prices based on the elasticity estimated in table 9, ∆valuation.
38 
 
When the NPV is compared with ∆A, using a 10% annual real interest rate we find that 
both magnitudes are similar, which implies that the DPS subsidies are transferred almost 
entirely to housing prices. 
 
Table 10. Comparison of the net present value of subsidies 
with their incidence on housing prices
* 
                                                 
38 A 100% subsidy variation approximately represents 75%, 80% and 40% of the standard deviations of EE, 
AA, and piped gas subsidies respectively. On the other hand, households in the survey report mortgage 
payments around 1.05% of their houses appraisal, which is close to the 1.09% they would have to pay as 
annuity for a 15 years (the standard duration of mortgage loans in Colombia) loan at a 10% annual interest 
rate. Currently, rates on mortgage loans reached historical lows of inflation (always beyond 5%) plus 7%. 
Clearly our estimates are expected values, since there is uncertainty on several variables like interest rates, 
opportunity cost of households, and subsidies themselves among others. Finally, we estimate the net present 
value of subsidies as the one of the perpetuity of the mean subsidy reported in table 8 at the reference interest 
rate. For energy, we have that NPV of subsidies is 8108/[(1+r)
1/N-1)], where r is 0.10 or 0.15, and N is 12.   28
Energy, EE 0.0297 1,016,810 -1,811,439 1,320,298 4,014,419 1.30 -2.22
EE+AA 3,164,444 -6,027,830 2,775,701 7,822,675 0.88 -1.30
Total Subsidies 0.0505 3,083,605 -6,139,050 2,497,108 6,520,789 0.81 -1.06






0.0295 2,147,633 -4,216,391 1,455,403 3,808,256 0.68 -0.90





Due to Change 
in Contribution
 
Energy, EE 0.0297 692,125 -1,233,015 1,320,298 4,014,419 1.91 -3.26
EE+AA 2,153,982 -4,103,039 2,775,701 7,822,675 1.29 -1.91
Total Subsidies 0.0505 2,098,956 -4,178,745 2,497,108 6,520,789 1.19 -1.56
Table of average results for annual discount rate of 15%







Due to Change 
in Subsidy






* Net present values of subsidies and contributions, as well as changes in valuations, are in Colombian pesos 
of 2003. Results are obtained with the sample located at an average 250 m from the border (500 m. between 
each house and the closest one from another stratum), and correcting for measurement error. The change in 
house valuation, ∆valuation, is generated by a 100% change in subsidy. 
 
Finally, table 11 illustrates not only how net subsidy becomes actually a tax, but also how it 
is distributed by income decile, for both, EE and AA. Only when the EE subsidy is 
discounted at a 10% annual real interest rate, a positive subsidy for the poorest households 
is found. However, that is the population expected to have a higher opportunity cost of 
money, for which it would be expected to be the one more likely to discount subsidy flows 
at a higher rate. There are important reductions in AA subsidies due to housing 
capitalization in the case or AA, where only the poorest 20% of the population end up 
receiving a somewhat relevant amount. 
 
In short, the estimates obtained allow us concluding that DPS subsidies are almost entirely 
transferred to the value of the house that receives them, without generating an apparent 
benefit on the net, only distorting housing prices. 
 
Table 11. Distribution of DPS subsidies net of their incidence on house value. 
Bogotá, 2003
* 
Energy, EE   29








1 381,543,074 5.5% 7,018,174 0.1% -168,676,493 -2.4%
2 488,009,656 2.2% 16,445,345 0.1% -204,771,828 -0.9%
3 545,908,526 1.7% -30,098,973 -0.1% -300,311,872 -0.9%
4 617,593,442 1.3% 24,199,277 0.1% -254,169,879 -0.6%
5 674,633,707 1.0% -6,097,110 -0.01% -325,437,100 -0.5%
6 629,887,029 0.7% -58,899,267 -0.1% -382,018,229 -0.4%
7 612,863,369 0.5% -155,701,525 -0.1% -516,245,621 -0.4%
8 591,676,242 0.3% -280,949,748 -0.2% -690,310,420 -0.4%
9 463,921,284 0.2% -286,651,201 -0.1% -638,754,762 -0.3%
10 224,639,582 0.1% -231,103,448 -0.1% -444,898,606 -0.1%
Total 5,230,675,911 0.43% -1,001,838,476 -0.08% -3,925,594,811 -0.32%








Water and Sewerage, AA 








1 959,510,155 13.8% 543,167,767 7.8% 347,856,128 5.0%
2 1,171,353,736 5.4% 682,522,562 3.1% 453,205,078 2.1%
3 1,323,456,238 4.1% 716,325,415 2.2% 431,512,307 1.3%
4 1,449,931,661 3.1% 795,147,452 1.7% 487,979,104 1.1%
5 1,598,213,756 2.4% 874,442,736 1.3% 534,911,601 0.8%
6 1,558,287,689 1.8% 786,617,779 0.9% 424,616,910 0.5%
7 1,530,139,810 1.3% 610,165,333 0.5% 178,592,787 0.2%
8 1,494,818,640 0.8% 428,601,977 0.2% -71,574,625 -0.04%
9 1,356,714,458 0.5% 237,980,898 0.1% -286,832,010 -0.1%
10 874,734,539 0.2% -189,031,175 -0.05% -688,057,709 -0.2%








* Results are obtained with the sample located at an average 250 m from the border (500 m between each 
house and the closest one from another stratum), and correcting for measurement error. 
 
Results for rent prices 
 
The ECV asks households who pay rent for their monthly paiment. In addition, it asks those 
who live in their own houses for the rental amount they consider the house would generate 
if it was rented. Using as dependent variable the logarithm of the rents reported in either 
case, we repeat the exercise previously done. The results show a positive relation between 
EE and AA subsidies and the logarithm of the rent paid by households. 
 
Based on our RD estimates obtained in a similar way as we did for house valuation, we find 
that the increase in the monthly rent due to subsidies is 2.45 and 1.04 times, the amount of 
EE and AA subsidies received respectively.   30
 
Potential biases due to capitalization effects of taxes or other subsidies 
 
Although our estimates account for most of the relevant necessary factors to obtain 
unbiased coefficients, there are still other factors not accounted for that might be driving 




In the case of property tax, Bogotá since 1993 until late 2003, right after the ECV2003 
survey took place, implemented a property tax that had higher rates for houses in higher 
strata, and within strata, to those with larger built areas. In order to assess whether our 
results are driven by property taxes rather than by DPS subsidies, we include in equation 
the log of the effective property tax rate as an additional control variable. We also got 
estimates that included a dummy variable equal to one if the household was beneficiary of 
the subsidized regime, SR, the public health insurance targeted indirectly according to the 
socioeconomic stratum to the poorest population.
40 Beneficiaries of the SR receive annually 
nearly 1% of GDP in health insurance subsidies. 
 
Table 12 presents the result once we control for property tax and the SR. The coefficient of 
the linear term of EE becomes slightly smaller while that of AA becomes larger, and their 
statistical significance is not as robust as found. Nonetheless, even for the case in which 
both the logarithm of the effective property tax tariff and the affiliation to the subsidized 
regimen variables are included, each pair of the coefficients on EE and AA are jointly 
significant at levels higher than 90%. 
 
                                                 
39 We also checked whether including a measure of the average subsidy on each side of the boundaries would 
change our results. We obtained LLR estimates of energy subsidies evaluated at each side of each boundary, 
conditional on being near each respective boundary, Results remain mostly unaffected. 
40 SR is targeted according to a Proxy-means test denominated Sisben, which is highly correlated to 
socioeconomic strata.   31
On the other hand, our results suggest some evidence of property tax capitalization, with a 
negative and significant coefficient for the property tax effective tariff.
41 In addition, the 
inclusion of the SR has negligible effects on the relevant coefficients.
42 
 
Table 12. House price model results with additional controls 
Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t
Subsidy of Energy 2.41E-06 1.56 3.02E-06 1.77 3.61E-06 1.95 3.78E-06 1.94 4.01E-06 1.86
Subsidy of Piped water and sewerage 2.68E-06 2.83 2.92E-06 2.84 2.79E-06 2.55 2.80E-06 1.60 2.89E-06 1.63
Subsidy of Piped gas 5.58E-07 0.08 -5.82E-06 -0.77 -4.51E-06 -0.56 -6.73E-06 -0.77 -7.36E-06 -0.75
S u b s i d y  o f  E n e r g y  s q u a r e d 7 . 1 2 E - 1 11 . 6 97 . 2 0 E - 1 11 . 5 63 . 4 0 E - 1 10 . 7 12 . 1 4 E - 1 10 . 3 51 . 6 7 E - 1 20 . 0 2
Subsidy of Piped water and sewerage squared -1.47E-11 -0.97 -2.95E-11 -1.70 -1.76E-11 -0.98 -1.06E-11 -0.32 -4.77E-12 -0.14
Subsidy of Piped gas squared 4.13E-10 0.45 -1.12E-10 -0.11 -4.37E-10 -0.45 -5.23E-10 -0.40 -1.53E-10 -0.11
Ln(τ) -0.024 -1.79 -0.038 -2.74 -0.038 -2.68 -0.030 -2.07 -0.036 -2.33
600 500 1000 800 700
Variable
 
Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t
Subsidy of Energy 2.33E-06 1.50 2.99E-06 1.75 3.46E-06 1.88 3.59E-06 1.84 3.72E-06 1.72
Subsidy of Piped water and sewerage 2.69E-06 2.83 2.90E-06 2.81 2.76E-06 2.51 2.80E-06 1.59 2.89E-06 1.61
Subsidy of Piped gas 3.52E-07 0.05 -5.78E-06 -0.76 -4.26E-06 -0.53 -6.45E-06 -0.74 -7.36E-06 -0.76
Subsidy of Energy squared 6.96E-11 1.65 7.14E-11 1.55 3.15E-11 0.66 1.86E-11 0.30 -2.72E-12 -0.04
Subsidy of Piped water and sewerage squared -1.47E-11 -0.97 -2.99E-11 -1.72 -1.85E-11 -1.04 -1.26E-11 -0.38 -7.12E-12 -0.21
Subsidy of Piped gas squared 4.09E-10 0.44 -9.03E-11 -0.09 -3.83E-10 -0.40 -4.65E-10 -0.35 -1.09E-10 -0.07
Ln(τ) -0.025 -1.80 -0.0381 -2.7 -0.0375 -2.68 -0.030 -2.10 -0.037 -2.38
RS -0.037 -1.47 -0.032 -1.20 -0.049 -1.68 -0.042 -1.62 -0.051 -1.75
Variable
1000 800 700 600 500
 
* The dependent variable is the logarithm of the house appraisal. Results are the equivalent to those reported 
in table 8 once Ln(τ) and RS are included. t statistics are estimated based on robust standard errors. 
 
Other potential biases 
 
Despite we consider our results make a good case in providing evidence of capitalization of 
public utility subsidies on house prices, our methodology is not free of caveats. First, there 
are several issues standard to hedonic regressions that might be generating biases in our 
estimates such as the presence of substantial heterogeneity across households, spatial 
correlation, etc. Secondly, although the evidence provided supports to a large extent the 
validity of the RD assumptions (i) and (ii) specified in section 4, namely having similar 
houses across boundaries subject to different subsidies, in the case of assumption (ii) there 
would still need to be proven whether unobservable characteristics change smoothly around 
                                                 
41 We used as well and augmented sample that included both the households who reported the amount paid as 
property tax, as well as those who did not report it, assigning them the theoretic tariff to the later, and results 
did not change significantly. 
42 Intuitively though, one could expect in the future the inclusion of the SR to have a positive effect on house 
prices, as the recently implemented “New Sisben” score makes households living in a house that belongs to a 
lower stratum to have smaller the score used to target the SR, thus increasing the probability of being 
beneficiary once a households moves just across the borders between strata (in particular when households 
move from 1-2 strata to 3 and higher or viceversa), affecting house prices just in a similar way public utility 
subsidies do.   32
the boundaries as well. In addition, assumptions (iii) and (iv), imply more demanding 
requirements in our case.  
 
Assumption (ii) would not be satisfied if for example differences in preferences across 
races could lead individuals from different races to segregate across the boundaries. Since 
people would value differently the network each neighborhood offers them, this could be an 
example of an unobservable characteristic we would not be controlling for, that could 
change discontinuously around the boundaries. In general, since people can estimate in 
advance the benefits they could receive from locating at any side of the boundaries, one 
could argue that some sort of sorting around the boundaries on unobservable 
characteristics, such as households’ preferences, should be taking place in practice. As long 
as such sorting will very likely become a characteristic that affects house prices in a 
discontinuous way around boundaries, the mechanics that generates this sorting would 
imply a violation of assumptions (iv), which in this context would come along with a 
violation of assumption (ii), and in some cases, (iii). 
 
The effect of eliminating Stratification as targeting mechanism 
 
Given our results, a natural question is: who would be the winners and losers of abolishing 
the targeting system of subsidies to public utility services as it currently is in urban 
Colombia? The answer depends on whether households are tenants or owners of houses. If 
a household is a tenant in the house it is living, then once the targeting system were 
abolished, they would receive no public utility services subsidies, but end up paying a 
lower rent, in a similar amount to the subsidy previously received, thus staying relatively 
indifferent with respect to its previous situation. On the other hand, if the household is the 
owner of the house, then its wealth would decrease (increase) in an amount equivalent to 
the present value of the subsidies (taxes) on public utility services it was receiving (paying) 
through a higher rent paid by their tenants. 
 
We should bear in mind that our baseline scenario is the current one, in which public 
expenditure in public utility domiciliary services is playing no role but distorting relative   33
houses prices. Poor households have to pay in advance in the price of their houses, the 
present value of the flow of subsidies their houses provide, as well as the wealthy 
households pay for their houses a lower price, in an amount equivalent to the present value 
of the flow of taxes their houses demand. 
 
Paradoxically, although the current subsidies scheme as currently is, is playing no role, 
abolishing it would not be indifferent to individuals. Table 13 illustrates the distribution of 
owner and tenant households by socioeconomic stratum in Bogotá. 
 
As the table shows, the subsidies policy has required about half of the households living in 
strata one to three (those owners of the house they live in), to pay a price for their houses 
that is higher than what it would have been in the absence of the subsidies scheme. 
Eliminating current subsidies scheme, and adopting a flat rate equivalent to the marginal 
cost to houses in any strata, would be equivalent to expropriating these households the 
value they paid, or had paid, for their houses under the previous conditions. Furthermore, as 
the table shows, the median voter would be a loser of abolishing the current subsidies 
scheme, what anticipates a political economy constraint to reforming it. Put another way, if 
the current scheme were to be abolished, households owners of houses located in the 
poorest strata would require to be compensated by an amount equivalent to the distortion 
the government had caused with the scheme itself (which seems budgetary unfeasible). 
 
Table 13. House ownership by socioeconomic stratum. Bogotá, 2003 
Owner Tenant Owner Tenant Owner Tenant Total
0 0 1 0.0 0.0 21.3 78.7 100
1 330 445 5.5 6.6 42.6 57.4 100
2 2,287 2,010 38.2 29.7 53.2 46.8 100
3 2,634 2,844 44.0 42.1 48.1 51.9 100
4 435 828 7.3 12.2 34.5 65.5 100
5 189 356 3.2 5.3 34.7 65.3 100
6 107 279 1.8 4.1 27.7 72.3 100
Total 5,982 6,764 100.0 100.0 46.9 53.1 100
Ownership by stratum Number of Houses Distribution by stratum
Stratum 
 
   34
Clearly, eliminating the current subsidies scheme would be regressive, but beyond the cost 
of keeping or modifying the current subsidies scheme, the question here is whether the 
government is achieving with these subsidies what it sought. According to Law 142 of 
1994, the government sought to “establish a regime of rates proportional to low income 
sectors, according to principles of equity and solidarity”, and continues arguing: “the 
subsidies scheme, will be provided so that low income people can afford to pay the rates of 
domiciliary public utility services that cover their basic needs”. If savings due to subsidies 
are being paid to a distorted, because of the subsidy, house price, or rental value, then none 
of these goals is being achieved with the current scheme. 
 
Still, as the current subsidies scheme goes on, the government keeps allowing the 
assignment of nearly 0.7% of GDP in gross subsidies to households in strata 1, 2 and 3, 
0.3% of which come out of its budget, and 0.4% from households living in strata 5 and 6, 
and from commercial, public and industrial sectors, ending up doing nothing but distorting 
relative house prices and the efficient assignment of factor in the productive sector, even 
though it has several different mechanisms to comply with the above mentioned purposes. 
There are several unfavorable side effects of the stratification scheme. On one side, there 
are perverse incentives to individuals seeking to become targeted by public authorities in 
charge of assigning subsidies, which has led among other things, and according to the 
ECV1997 and ECV2003, to an increase in the household living in strata 1 and 2 of 100% 
and 14% between 1997 and 2003, while those living in strata 4 and 5 decreased 10% and 
43% respectively. These changes will have direct effects on Colombian proxy-means test 
targeting system, which recently became highly correlated to socioeconomic stratification. 
 
On the other side, stratification leads to segregated communities of the poorest and the 
richest. Reversing such segregation would seem unfeasible in we accept as reasonable the 
sentence by Grodzins (1957) as quoted by Schelling (1972): “Once an urban area begins to 
swing from mainly white to mainly black, the change is rarely reversed”.
43 
                                                 
43 Cutler and Glaeser (1997), Kremer (1997), and Card and Rothstein (2006) among others, find evidence of 
effects of segregation on inequality (higher segregation implying higher differences in several outcomes 
between segregated groups), mobility, and test scores (higher segregation implying higher test scores gap 
between groups)   35
 
Other schemes, based on instruments like the SISBEN, a proxy-means test that allows 
ordering houses from the poorest to the richest according to their permanent income, could 
be consider for targeting subsidies to public utility services. Such mechanism is being used 
in Colombia to target demand subsidies to health, by providing health insurance for the 
poor. As we mentioned previously, the government expends annually about 1.0% of GDP 
in that program; thus, resources currently located to subsidize public utility services would 
suffice to increase this budget in 70%.
44 In addition, according to Medina and Morales 
(2007), deadweight losses associated to electricity and water subsidies amount nearly to 5% 
and 10% of their respective subsidies. This implies that if we eliminated subsidies to public 
utility services, and transferred to households the required compensated variation, 
households would end up as well as they were previously with their subsidies, housing 
prices would not be distorted, and we would save up to US$35 millions per year previously 
spent in efficiency losses, much less than what we would require to keep the Sisben 
mechanism working, estimated in about US$7 million every five years. 
 
If the government wanted to eliminate stratification as its targeting mechanism, an option to 
face the potential political economy restrictions, would be to do it on a very long period of 
time, say 20 years, while simultaneously introducing another mechanism, such as the 
Sisben. 
 
On the other hand, policies proposing to lower the level of basic consumption subject to 
subsidies, would not per se improve targeting, due to the high level of subsidies 




The cross subsidies schemes have been widely used in Latin-American countries to deliver 
domiciliary public utility services (electricity, piped water and sewerage services, and piped 
                                                 
44 Benefits from better access to health services, as opposed to public utility services, is less likely to end up 
being auctioned in the market, and more likely to comply with the goals sought by the government in its 
public utility services policy.   36
gas) to low income population at rates that are below their costs, whereas the higher income 
population contributes by paying rates above the costs. While there is a consensus in most 
countries on the relevance of subsidizing the consumption of said services, their policies 
have focused into minimizing the inefficiencies implied in subsidies and making their 
targeting more effective. 
 
In Colombia there is a cross subsidy system which charges subsidized rates to the 
households who live in houses located in strata associated to low wealth levels, and taxed 
rates to households that live in strata associated to high wealth levels.  
 
Even if the consumption of domiciliary public utility services is nontransferable, this 
document assesses the hypothesis that the flow of subsidies that potentially could be 
received from a specific house, could be discounted by housing market agents, so that most 
of them end up being transferred to the prices of the houses that generate the subsidies, 
rather than staying in the pockets of households that reside in them. 
 
In order to estimate the effect that subsidies to domiciliary public utility services can have 
on houses value, the prices for houses on both sides of the boundary of different 
socioeconomic strata are compared, this is, houses subject to different public utility service 
rates, and it is found that the increment in house value estimated because of subsidies, is 
similar in magnitude to the present value of the flow of subsidies discounted at reasonable 
market rates. Likely effects of these subsidies are found on the rent amount. 
 
Although the results found include information only for Bogotá, we think that the same 
would be consistent with the current situation in the main Colombian cities. The above 
takes us to conclude that the functions of financing subsidies for the poor population 
through public spending in domiciliary public utility services in Colombia is being 
achieved, if anything, in a very limited way. Most of the fiscal effort on this subject has as 
its final effect, the distortion of houses prices in different socioeconomic strata. While the 
system assigns 0.7% of GDP each year in supposed gross subsidies to domiciliary public 
utility services in Colombia, the only thing they end up doing is introducing an additional   37
characteristic (subsidies, which would not exist without government intervention) into a set 
of houses, and moving the housing market to auctioning such characteristic, with the 
consequent distortion on houses relative prices. 
 
The evidence contained in this document calls for a review of the subsidy targeting policies 
for domiciliary public utility services in Colombia and other countries in the region that 
have similar schemes. It is important to continue gathering evidence that allows generating 
consensus around the benefits and limitations of this type of schemes, as an eventual review 
of them should at first, face important political economy constraints, which have been and 
will continue to be a bottle neck in the achievement of more efficient and better targeted 
subsidies.   38
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Annex 1. T-statistics obtained when comparing means of characteristics between the 
better and worse sides of the boundaries  
 
750 500 250 150 125
House valuation -0.68 -0.85 1.30 1.09 -1.48
House valuation per square meter -5.90 -6.75 -6.15 -1.78 -0.55
Log valuation -4.21 -3.39 -1.90 -1.00 -2.42
Log valuation per square meter -7.67 -8.35 -7.92 -4.02 -1.48
Estimated monthly subsidy of energy 9.69 10.51 10.06 9.33 6.92
Estimated monthly subsidy of piped water and sewerage 9.41 9.91 10.20 8.75 5.80
Estimated monthly subsidy of piped gas 11.74 13.76 12.77 11.98 8.06
Number of rooms -9.93 -9.77 -7.07 -3.93 -4.60
Number of bathrooms -2.71 -2.49 -2.88 -1.06 -4.53
House with Piped gas service -4.35 -3.86 -1.65 -1.10 -2.89
House with telephone -3.15 -3.06 -1.41 -1.58 -0.93
House with garden 0.38 1.23 0.48 0.71 -1.10
House with court yard 3.15 2.67 3.44 0.57 1.75
House with garage  -7.01 -6.86 -6.36 -3.66 -2.63
Parks in neighborhood -6.97 -10.85 -9.06 -6.98 -3.72
The house has suffered because of a natural disaster 3.15 3.36 3.66 2.48 2.73
House in area vulnerable to natural disasters 2.52 3.16 4.75 4.18 3.73
Factories in neighborhood -1.64 -1.35 1.79 0.84 0.11
Airport in neighborhood 1.88 -1.25 -0.93 0.00 0.00
Terminals of ground transportation in neighborhood -0.79 -1.98 -0.63 1.95 1.81
House close to open sewers -0.06 -0.99 1.02 -0.74 1.21
Plants of residual water treatment in neighborhood 0.69 0.71 0.00 0.00 0.00
Lines of hydrocarbon transportation in neighborhood 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
You feel safe in your neighborhood -2.38 -2.26 -1.61 -0.78 -1.70
Toilet inside the house -3.05 -2.57 -1.94 -0.83 -2.16
Daily supply of water -2.88 -2.09 -2.07 -4.08 -3.95
Provision of water is inside the house -1.56 -1.35 -0.50 -1.02 -1.18
The kitchen is a individual room -2.40 -1.98 -3.15 -1.97 -1.41
House** 2.37 3.31 2.61 0.30 -1.06
Floor material is Carpet 0.04 -0.02 -2.30 -1.40 -0.06
Floor material is any of: Floor tile, vinyl, tablet, wood  -2.87 -2.35 -0.28 0.58 0.01
Floor material is any of: Coarse wood, table, plank 0.89 1.63 2.28 1.29 1.88
Floor material is any of: Cement, gravilla, earth, sand 7.82 6.52 4.23 3.17 1.99
House with Toilet connected to the public sewerage -0.99 -0.09 -0.66 0.37 0.35
House with potable water service -1.19 -0.19 0.44 -0.02 0.13
Number of infantile shelters by censal sector -0.15 0.04 1.04 0.22 -1.29
Number of asylums  by censal sector 3.42 0.17 -0.67 -2.23 -1.36
Number of prisons by censal sector -1.75 -1.51 1.54 2.16 2.25
Number of convents  by censal sector -2.06 -1.09 -0.54 -3.28 0.37
Area of the land (squared meters) 3.46 4.12 4.75 2.52 0.15
Constructed area (squared meters) 0.93 2.26 4.77 3.84 1.56
Number of observation (full sample) 3,956 3,388 2,034 1,011 652
Number statisicaly different from zero 19 19 15 13 11
Total number of active controls 33 33 32 31 31




T-statistics test whether the difference in means between the better and worse sides of the boundaries are equal. Only 
variables statistically significant in all regressions estimated with boundary dummies are included. 
* The square meters 
used are the sum of those of the land plus those of the construction. 
** Dummy=1 if living in house (as opposed to an 
apartment, etc.). 
*** There are 18 frontiers that have on one side stratum 2 and on the other stratum 3, 10 with strata 1 and 
2, 16 with strata 3 and 4, 6 with strata 4 and 5, and 4 with strata 5 and 6. 
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Annex 2. Local linear regression estimates for worse and better sides 
of the boundaries between all strata
* 
Biweight kernel and a bandwidth of 600 m., were used in the LLR regression. 
* Estimates at the 
boundary differ from those presented in annex 3 since these graphs are estimated with the lp_regress 
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Annex 3. Local regression estimates and t-statistics obtained when comparing means 
of characteristics between the better and worse sides of boundaries between all strata 
E(⋅|Distance≈0) Std. Err. E(⋅|Distance≈0) Std. Err.
Logarithm of house valuation 12.105 0.062 12.117 0.047 -0.2
Logarithm of house valuation per square meter 
* 12.108 0.055 12.116 0.042 -0.1
Estimated monthly subsidy of energy 2,704 638 7,879 757 -5.2
Estimated monthly subsidy of piped water and sewerage 8,993 1,346 16,544 1,314 -4.0
Number of rooms 3.768 0.173 3.288 0.172 2.0
Number of bathrooms 1.644 0.087 1.467 0.081 1.5
House with piped gas service 0.674 0.043 0.579 0.065 1.2
House with telephone 0.923 0.035 0.918 0.036 0.1
House with garden 0.406 0.065 0.460 0.068 -0.6
House with court yard 0.024 0.014 0.048 0.028 -0.8
House with garage  0.310 0.052 0.182 0.046 1.8
Parks in neighborhood 0.135 0.030 0.042 0.030 2.2
The house has suffered because of a natural disaster 0.016 0.017 0.056 0.032 -1.1
House in area vulnerable to natural disasters 0.0003 0.015 0.061 0.037 -1.5
Factories in neighborhood 0.165 0.038 0.210 0.048 -0.7
Airport in neighborhood 0.007 0.003 0.003 0.002 1.0
Terminals of ground transportation in neighborhood 0.022 0.007 0.025 0.007 -0.3
House close to open sewers 0.046 0.031 0.041 0.039 0.1
You feel safe in your neighborhood 0.584 0.050 0.645 0.061 -0.8
Toilet inside the house 1.0 0.004 0.999 0.009 0.4
Daily supply of water 1.0 0.006 0.854 0.042 3.6
Provision of water is inside the house 1.0 0.005 0.997 0.008 0.8
The kitchen is a individual room 0.973 0.018 0.952 0.028 0.6
House** 0.481 0.058 0.406 0.061 0.9
Floor material is Carpet 0.123 0.031 0.109 0.030 0.3
Floor material is any of: Floor tile, vinyl, tablet, wood  0.682 0.049 0.783 0.050 -1.4
Floor material is any of: Coarse wood, table, plank 0.025 0.013 0.042 0.017 -0.8
Floor material is any of: Cement, gravilla, earth, sand 0.996 0.005 0.9999 0.0001 -0.7
House with Toilet connected to the public sewerage 1.0 0.004 1.0 0.002 -0.7
House with potable water service 0.040 0.027 0.026 0.028 0.3
Number of prisons by censal sector 0.006 0.002 0.015 0.004 -1.9
Number of infantile shelters by censal sector 0.084 0.024 0.033 0.019 1.7
Number of asylums  by censal sector 0.225 0.046 0.109 0.033 2.1
Number of convents  by censal sector 0.173 0.068 0.025 0.040 1.9
Area of the land (squared meters) 150.714 8.624 153.633 12.520 -0.2
Constructed area (squared meters) 105.251 8.077 90.451 7.291 1.4
Number statisticaly different from cero 4
Total number of active controls 32
Percentage different from cero out of all active controls 12.5
Variable




1/ t-statistics tests whether the difference in LLR estimates evaluated close to the boundaries (distance ≈ 0) 
between the better and worse sides of the boundaries is different from cero. Only variables statistically 
significant in all regressions estimated with boundary dummies, and active at the boundaries with the chosen 
bandwidth, are included. Sample weights, biweight kernel and a bandwidth of 600 m., were used in the LLR 
regression. Bootstrap standard errors are obtained based on 100 replications with 100% sampling. 
* The 
square meters used in the sum of those of land plus those of construction. 
** Dummy=1 if living in house (as 
opposed to an apartment, etc.).   44
Annex 4. House price model results: basic OLS regression
* 
Variable Coefficient  T 
Number of rooms  0.0182  4.9 
Number of bathrooms  0.1071  15.9 
House with piped gas service  0.0187  1.9 
House with telephone  -0.0101  -0.6 
House with garden  0.0193  2.2 
House with court yard  0.0269  1.2 
House with garage   0.0631  6.7 
House with terrace  -0.0139  -1.4 
Parks in neighborhood  0.0722  5.6 
The house has suffered because of a natural disaster  0.0042  0.1 
House in area vulnerable to natural disasters  -0.0415  -1.7 
Factories in neighborhood  -0.0131  -1.1 
Garbage collector in neighborhood  -0.0728  -2.6 
Market places in neighborhood  0.0127  0.7 
Airport in neighborhood  -0.0315  -1.3 
Terminals of ground transportation in neighborhood  0.0470  2.2 
House close to open sewers  -0.0556  -4.7 
Plants of residual water treatment in neighborhood  0.2513  6.4 
Lines of hydrocarbon transportation in neighborhood  0.1315  3.8 
House close to high tension lines of electricity transmission  -0.0084  -0.3 
You feel safe in your neighborhood  0.0121  1.5 
Toilet inside the house  -0.0453  -0.9 
Daily supply of water  0.0063  0.2 
Provision of water is inside the house  -0.0062  -0.1 
The kitchen is a individual room  0.1054  2.7 
House
** -0.1301  -13.1 
Walls material is any of: Brick, block, stone, polished wood   0.0254  0.6 
Floor material is any of: Marmol, parque, lacquered wood  0.0049  0.2 
Floor material is Carpet  0.0548  2.4 
Floor material is any of: Floor tile, vinyl, tablet, wood   0.0136  0.7 
Floor material is any of: Cement, gravilla, earth, sand  -0.0971  -4.1 
House with Toilet connected to the public sewerage  0.2671  2.8 
House with potable water service  0.0894  1.0 
Number of infantile shelters by censal sector  -0.0148  -1.2 
Number of asylums  by censal sector  0.0153  1.86 
Number of prisons by censal sector  0.0479  1.7 
Number of convents  by censal sector  0.0316  7.0 
Stratum 2  0.2364  6.0 
Stratum 3  0.6205  13.6   45
Stratum 4  0.9170  17.8 
Stratum 5  1.1879  19.9 
Stratum 6  1.4192  19.8 
Area of the land (squared meters)  0.0010  5.4 
Interaction variable Land*stratum2  0.0001  0.2 
Interaction variable Land*stratum3  0.0015  6.5 
Interaction variable Land*stratum4  0.0016  5.9 
Interaction variable Land*stratum5  -0.0012  -2.8 
Interaction variable Land*stratum6  -0.0008  -1.6 
Constructed area (squared meters)  0.0039  21.2 
Interaction variable Constructed area*stratum2  -0.0001  -0.4 
Interaction variable Constructed area*stratum3  -0.0012  -6.3 
Interaction variable Constructed area*stratum4  -0.0011  -4.2 
Interaction variable Constructed area*stratum5  0.0009  2.7 
Interaction variable Constructed area*stratum6  0.0014  4.5 
Constant 15.6763  112 
R
2 0.872 
Number of observations  5,292 
* Coefficients found from estimating equation (1) not shown in column A of table 7. Robust 
standard errors are estimated. Results are very similar when we also adjust them for clustering 
either at the boundary dummy level, or at each side of the boundary dummy level. Boundary 
dummies are not included, although Bogota´s neighborhood fixed effects (19) are. 